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FUHRMANN V. STAPLES OFFICE SUPERSTORE EAST, 
INC.: A SPLIT IN THE LAW COURT AS TO THE 
DEFINITION OF “EMPLOYER” DEMONSTRATES 
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO AMEND 
THE MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT IN ORDER TO 
PROTECT MAINE EMPLOYEES 
Stephen B. Segal* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc.,1 Jamie Fuhrmann 
submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) 
against her former employer, Staples Office Superstore East, Inc. (Staples), and 
four of her individual supervisors.2  After the Commission granted her right to sue, 
she filed a complaint in court alleging whistleblower retaliation under the 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA)3 and the Maine Human Rights Act 
(MHRA),4 as well as sex discrimination under the MHRA.5  Specifically, 
Fuhrmann alleged that Staples and her supervisors “unlawfully discriminated 
against her based both on her status as a woman with children and in retaliation for 
reporting what she believed to be illegal conduct.”6  The Superior Court granted 
Staples’ motion for summary judgment on all counts,7 and granted the four 
supervisors’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that individual supervisor liability 
is not permitted under either the WPA or MHRA.8 
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, 
vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Fuhrmann’s whistleblower claim on 
the grounds that there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to why Staples refused to accommodate Fuhrmann’s work schedule.9  In 
addition, the Law Court was asked to rule for the first time “whether the MHRA 
and the WPA provide for individual liability of supervisory employees.”10  
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank 
Professor Dmitry Bam for his insightful comments and suggestions on this Note, as well as family and 
friends for their ongoing support and encouragement. 
 1. 2012 ME 135, 58 A.3d 1083.    
 2. Id. ¶ 10.  
 3. 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(A) (2007).  
 4. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (2013). 
 5. Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 10, 58 A.3d 1083. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. ¶ 11.  Fuhrmann alleged in her complaint that after she informed Staples of a “coding 
discrepancy” she discovered, id. ¶ 5, Staples refused to change her employment status from full-time to 
part-time, id. ¶ 8.  As a result, she felt forced to resign.  Id. ¶ 9.  In granting Staples its motion for 
summary judgment, the Superior Court concluded that there was “no causal link between her” report of 
potential illegal conduct, and Staples’ refusal to change her work schedule.  Id. ¶ 11.  
 8. Id. ¶ 10.  
 9. Id. ¶ 21.  
 10. Id. ¶ 22.  The Law Court had previously addressed the question of individual supervisor liability 
and ruled that such liability was allowable under the MHRA in a withdrawn opinion. Gordan v. 
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Although the Commission interpreted the MHRA as allowing for “individual 
supervisor liability for employment discrimination” and argued that the Law Court 
should hold that the WPA does as well,11 the Law Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that 
neither the WPA nor the MHRA provides for individual supervisor liability in 
employment discrimination claims, and thereby affirmed the supervisors’ motions 
to dismiss.12  In coming to its conclusion, the majority reasoned that based on the 
purpose of both statutes in conjunction with how each defines “employer,” only the 
business itself is to be held liable for the conduct of its employees.13  The majority 
also noted that “[i]f the Legislature had intended to create individual supervisor 
liability it would have done so explicitly in much clearer terms.”14  Justice Levy, in 
writing for the dissent, disagreed that individual supervisor liability could not be 
maintained under the MHRA because the definition of employer does in fact allow 
for such liability, and the court “should [also] defer to the reasonable interpretation 
of the . . . Commission.”15  The dissent also noted that any policy concerns existent 
within the “plain language of the statute” should be left to the Legislature to 
address—not the judiciary.16 
This Note considers whether the majority in Fuhrmann properly concluded 
that individual supervisor liability is nonexistent under the WPA and MHRA, or if 
the Law Court should have interpreted the language of the MHRA to provide for 
such liability and give deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, as 
the dissent argues.  This Note begins in Part II with a brief examination of the 
purposes of the WPA and MHRA, as well as the function of the Commission as the 
administering agency of the MHRA.  This part will also explore how the court has 
determined when it is “reasonable” to defer to the interpretation given to a statute 
by an administering agency.  In Part III, this Note analyzes how Fuhrmann will 
clearly prevent plaintiffs from suing the individual wrongdoer(s) in employment 
discrimination claims.  In Part IV, this Note proposes that the Legislature should 
explicitly declare whether or not the MHRA provides for individual supervisor 
liability, but until that happens, the court should have deferred to the Commission’s 
interpretation because it was reasonable.  Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by 
arguing that the Legislature should declare that individual supervisor liability exists 
under the MHRA, at least in narrow circumstances, because invoking such liability 
would be consistent with the overall purposes of the Act: to prevent unlawful 
employment discrimination and ensure that discriminated employees have suitable 
recourse. 
                                                                                                     
Cummings, No. CUM-99-254, 2000 WL 419716 (Me. Apr. 19, 2000), withdrawn and replaced by 2000 
ME 68, 756 A.2d 942.  Because the opinion was not binding on the court, however, the majority chose 
not to follow its reasoning in the present case.  Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 22 n.6, 58 A.3d 1083. 
 11. Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 31, 58 A.3d 1083.  
 12. Id. ¶ 35.  
 13. Id. ¶ 32.  
 14. Id. ¶ 34.  
 15. Id. ¶ 36 (Levy, J., dissenting).  The dissent agreed with the majority, however, in vacating the 
motion for summary judgment.  Id.   
 16. Id. ¶ 49.  
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The WPA and MHRA  
The Maine WPA is a public policy measure designed to protect an employee 
from employer retaliation (such as termination from employment) after reporting 
potential illegal conduct to his employer.17  Specifically, the Act provides as 
follows:  
No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or 
privileges of employment because: The employee, acting in good faith . . . reports 
orally or in writing to the employer or a public body what the employee has 
reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of 
this State, a political subdivision of this State or the United States.18  
In order for an employee to come within the Act’s protection, he must first 
report the conduct to his supervisor, thus allowing the employer an opportunity to 
correct the issue if necessary.19  The only exception to this general rule  is when an 
employee has “specific reason” to think that reporting the possible violation to the 
employer will not provide a quick remedy.20  If an employee follows these 
requirements and believes that his rights as a whistleblower have been violated, he 
may file a complaint with the Commission and request that an investigation be 
conducted.21  By following this process, the WPA creates “a right to the discharged 
employee, and a remedial scheme to vindicate that right.”22 
Examples of complaints alleging violations of the Maine WPA have included a 
factory employee’s claim that he was unlawfully discharged after reporting that he 
smelled “noxious fumes” and believed certain products were being labeled 
improperly;23 a nurse’s claim that she was unlawfully terminated after informing 
the hospital that nurses were not receiving breaks during the workday;24 and a 
husband and wife’s claim that they were unlawfully discharged from their duties as 
hatcheries after reporting possible environmental violations.25 
A WPA violation in and of itself does not create a cause of action because the 
Act “does not itself provide a judicial remedy.”26  Instead, the MHRA allows an 
employee to pursue a cause of action based on a claim of discrimination as a 
whistleblower under the WPA: 
It is unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of this Act, except when 
based on a bona fide occupational qualification: For any employer to fail or refuse 
                                                                                                     
 17. Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 156 (Me. 1991).  
 18. 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(A) (2007).  
 19. Id. § 833(2).  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. § 834-A.  See discussion on procedures before the Commission infra Part II.B.   
 22. Bard, 590 A.2d at 156.  
 23. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1999).  
 24. Roussel v. St. Joseph Hosp., 257 F. Supp.2d 280, 283-84 (D. Me. 2003).  
 25. Smith v. Heritage Salmon, Inc., 180 F. Supp.2d 208, 212 (D. Me. 2002).  
 26. Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. Me. Dep’t of Def. & Veterans’ Servs., 627 A.2d 1005, 1007 n.8 
(Me. 1993).  
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to hire or otherwise discriminate against any applicant . . . because of previous 
actions taken by the applicant that are protected under [the WPA] . . . or, because 
of those reasons, to discharge an employee or discriminate with respect to hire, 
tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to 
employment . . . . 27 
In essence, the MHRA seeks to provide remedies to victims who have been 
subjected to unlawful employment discrimination.28  In addition to providing 
protection for those subject to whistleblower retaliation, the Act also prohibits 
employment discrimination on the bases of race, sexual orientation, sex, disability, 
religion, age, or national origin.29  As will be discussed in more depth in Part II.B 
of this Note, the Commission must first investigate whether there is enough 
evidence to warrant a finding that the complainant has been subjected to unlawful 
discrimination.30  If the Commission concludes that no “reasonable grounds” exist 
for such a finding, then it has the authority to dismiss the investigation.31  On the 
other hand, if the Commission believes that reasonable grounds do exist, it may 
attempt to settle the issue, file an action in court, or the complainant may request a 
“right-to-sue” letter from the Commission and pursue litigation himself if the 
Commission has not “entered into a conciliation agreement” or filed suit itself.32 
The Maine Legislature has made itself clear through enactment of the WPA 
and MHRA that its goal is to provide civil remedies for employees who are 
unlawfully discriminated against.  Prior to Fuhrmann, however, there remained 
some question as to who constitutes an “employer” under both the WPA and 
MHRA.  In other words, who may the employee attempt to bring a claim against?  
The WPA defines an employer as “a person who has one or more employees.  
‘Employer’ includes an agent of an employer and the State, or a political 
subdivision of the State.”33  An agent is generally defined as “[o]ne who is 
authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative.”34  In contrast, the 
MHRA defines an employer as “any person acting in the interest of any employer, 
directly or indirectly.”35  A person is defined under the MHRA as “one or more 
individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, municipal 
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and 
other legal representatives, labor organizations, mutual companies, joint-stock 
companies and unincorporated organizations and includes the State and all agencies 
                                                                                                     
 27. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (2013).  
 28. Katharine I. Rand, Comment, Taking Care of Business and Protecting Maine’s Employees: 
Supervisor Liability for Employment Discrimination Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 55 ME. L. 
REV. 427, 444 (2003) (explaining that the legislative record reveals that the MHRA was enacted in order 
to replace then existing criminal laws that punished the discriminator).  
 29. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A).  
 30. Id. § 4612(1)(B).  
 31. Id. § 4612(2). 
 32. Id. § 4612(3)-(4), (6).  
 33. 26 M.R.S.A. § 832(2) (2007).   
 34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 73 (9th ed. 2009).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 387 cmt. a (1958) (defining an agent as “one who acts on behalf of the principal and only for his 
benefit”).    
 35. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(4) (2013).  
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thereof.”36   
Neither definition of “employer” explicitly allows or prevents suit against an 
employee’s individual supervisor(s) who committed the alleged discrimination.  
Complicating matters even more, the legislative history is silent regarding the 
definitions and does not address whether the Acts are intended to support 
individual liability or only vicarious liability under the theory of respondeat 
superior.37  Although the Legislature was presented with bills in 2001 and 2003 to 
either explicitly include or exclude individual supervisor liability under the MHRA, 
the Legislature failed to act in either instance.38    
B. The Maine Human Rights Commission and Its Interpretation of “Employer” 
As a result, lower courts have struggled to reach a uniform decision on the 
matter, but the Commission has spoken in favor of individual supervisor liability 
for almost two decades.  The MHRA provides that the Act shall be carried out by 
the Commission, which has the central task of investigating claims of 
discrimination prohibited under the Act, and upon completion of its investigation, 
the Commission may make recommendations as to the proper course of action 
moving forward.39  Among those recommendations, the Commission has the right 
to appear in court,40 or file suit in Superior Court on behalf of the complainant.41  
After 180 days have passed since the complaint was filed, and if the Commission 
has not filed in court or become part of a conciliation agreement, “the complainant 
may request a right-to-sue letter” to file in court on his own behalf.42  If the letter is 
granted, the Commission must conclude its investigation.43  Furthermore, the 
complainant may then “file a civil action in the Superior Court against the person 
or persons who committed the unlawful discrimination.”44     
Before 1995, the Commission took the position that individual supervisors 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. § 4553(7).  The majority in Fuhrmann noted that nowhere within the MHRA definition is 
“supervisor” listed.  Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d 
1083.     
 37. See Rand, supra note 28, at 444-46 (discussing the lack of legislative history to clarify the 
definition of employer under the MHRA).  For a discussion of the concept of respondeat superior 
liability, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (defining the concept as one in which 
“[a]n employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of 
their employment.”).  
 38. L.D. 1599 (120th Legis. 2001) (proposing that individual liability should be explicitly excluded 
under the Act); L.D. 523 (121st Legis. 2003) (proposing that individual supervisor liability should be 
explicitly included under the Act).  See also Rand, supra note 28, at 457-61 (discussing the proponents 
and opponents’ arguments that were raised when L.D. 1599 was put before the House and Senate before 
it was ultimately voted down); Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission as Amicus Curiae at 17, 
Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, 58 A.3d 1083 (No. YOR-11-551) 
[hereinafter Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission] (explaining that L.D. 523 was never voted on 
by the Legislature).    
 39. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4566.  A complainant must file a charge of discrimination with the Commission 
within 300 days of the date of accrual.  Id. § 4611.    
 40. Id. § 4566(8).  
 41. Id. § 4612(4)(A).  
 42. Id. § 4612(6).  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. § 4621.  
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could not be held liable under the MHRA.45  This was a consistent position with the 
current stance taken generally by the Circuit Courts of Appeals that the definitions 
of “employer” under federal antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),46 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (ADEA),47 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)48 do 
not permit individual supervisor liability because Congress intended to incorporate 
only vicarious liability under these laws.49  Nevertheless, the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals also currently hold generally that the definitions of “employer” under the 
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),50 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 (FLSA)51 do allow for individual supervisor liability.52  The construction of 
federal employment law by federal courts has been deemed to be a relevant guide 
to Maine courts interpreting the WPA and MHRA.53  Yet, federal courts do not 
unanimously hold that all federal laws governing employment adopt vicarious 
liability exclusively.54  
Members of the Commission changed their positions entirely after 1995, and 
held that individual supervisors could be subject to liability under the MHRA.55  By 
2003, the Commission officially adopted this position, which continued through the 
Fuhrmann decision.56  The Commission has maintained its position even in light of 
several Maine district court decisions that have expressly held that individual 
supervisor liability does not exist under the MHRA.57  Other states, however, have 
ruled that individual supervisor liability may be maintained under its applicable 
                                                                                                     
 45. Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission, supra note 38, at 18.  
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person.”).  
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has twenty or more employees” and includes “any agent of such a person.”).  
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees . . . and any agent of such person.”).  
 49. See Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009); Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto 
Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (defining employer as “any person engaged in commerce or in any industry 
or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees . . . includ[ing] any person who acts, 
directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.”).  
 51. Id. § 203(d) (defining employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee.”).  
 52. See Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the Family Medical 
Leave Act allows for individual liability); Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the general view is that a corporation and its corporate officer may be held jointly and 
severally liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. and 
Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the definition of an employer under the Family 
Medical Leave Act allows for individuals other than the employer to be liable). 
 53. See Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 13, 915 A.2d 400 (explaining that the court’s 
“constru[ing] of the MHRA and []WPA has [long] been guided by federal law”).  
 54. For further discussion on this split in the federal realm, see Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, 
Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the 
Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 653-57 (2012).  
 55. See Memorandum from Commission Counsel on Individual Liability of Supervisors (Feb. 22, 
1995), reprinted in Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission, supra note 38, Ex. B.  
 56. Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission, supra note 38, at 18.  
 57. See Quiron v. L.N. Violette Co., Inc. 897 F. Supp. 18, 20-21 (D. Me. 1995); Gough v. E. Me. 
Dev. Corp., 172 F. Supp.2d 221, 224-25 (D. Me. 2001).  
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antidiscrimination statute.58  For example, in Washington, the State Supreme Court 
held that such a construction was logical and appropriate because “enabling 
employees to sue individual supervisors who have discriminated against them is 
consistent with the broad public policy to eliminate all discrimination in 
employment.”59 
In a withdrawn opinion, the Law Court ruled that individual supervisor 
liability did exist under the MHRA based on the plain language of the statute, and 
because “[t]he purpose of the statute is to discourage discrimination, and the best 
way to achieve that purpose is to hold the actual wrongdoer liable for his or her 
discriminatory actions.”60  Upon withdrawal of its opinion, however, the court 
declined to answer the question of whether individual supervisor liability existed 
under the MHRA because the plaintiff’s claim was deemed to be moot.61 
Clearly, there are differing opinions as to whether the definition of “employer” 
is meant to incorporate individual liability or only vicarious liability under the 
MHRA.  Even the Commission has changed its position over the years despite 
federal courts’ interpretation of the Act.  As discussed in Part II.C of this Note, the 
Law Court will defer to the interpretation of the administering agency whenever 
possible.  
C. How Maine Decides When to Defer to the Interpretation Given to a Statute by 
an Administering Agency 
When examining the language of a statute, the Law Court first analyzes its 
“plain meaning.”62  The court will rule based solely on the language contained in 
the statute unless it is ambiguous, in which case the court will also look to “the 
context of the whole statutory scheme to indicia of legislative intent such as the 
statute’s history and its underlying policy.”63  A statute may be ambiguous if prone 
to multiple interpretations that are reasonable.64  In addition, if the ambiguous 
statute in question is carried out by an administering agency, the court will uphold 
the interpretation given to the statute by the agency so long as it is reasonable, and 
so long as it does not “plainly compel[] a contrary result.”65  This analysis is similar 
to the federal standard, where if: 
[T]he court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
                                                                                                     
 58. See, e.g., Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 787-88 (Ohio 1999) (holding that for 
purposes of the Ohio employment antidiscrimination statute, “a supervisor/manager may be held jointly 
and/or severally liable with her/his employer for discriminatory conduct of the supervisor/manager in 
violation of [the statute].”); Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 928 (Wash. 2001) (“We 
hold individual supervisors, along with their employers, may be held liable for their discriminatory 
acts.”).     
 59. Brown, 20 P.3d at 928. 
 60. Gordan v. Cummings, No. CUM-99-254, 2000 WL 419716 (Me. Apr. 19, 2000), withdrawn and 
replaced by 2000 ME 68, 756 A.2d 942.  For quoted material from withdrawn opinion, see Rand, supra 
note 28, at 448-49.  
 61. Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68, ¶¶ 10-11, 756 A.2d 942.  
 62. Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 387.  
 63. HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 2011 ME 29, ¶ 17, 15 A.3d 725.  
 64. Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411.  
 65. Goodrich v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 2012 ME 95, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 212.  
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issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.66  
For example, in FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,67 the 
Law Court held that the administering agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute was reasonable.68  In that case, the Board of Environmental Protection 
(Board), which is the administering agency in charge of water quality in the state 
pursuant to Maine statute,69 ruled that the statute required FPL to either seek 
approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or follow an alternative 
review of its tests before continuing its dam project because FPL had implemented 
a new standard for evaluating water quality.70  The court reasoned that while the 
statute was ambiguous based on its plain meaning,71 the legislative history 
demonstrated that the Board’s interpretation of the statute requiring EPA approval 
based on the facts was reasonable, and thus, it would defer to the Board’s 
interpretation.72  While explaining its position in granting great deference to the 
Board when the interpretation of a statute is reasonable, the court concluded “that 
the [Board] has greater expertise in matters of environmental concern and greater 
experience administering and interpreting those particular statutes.”73     
Similarly, in Watt v. UniFirst Corp.,74 the Law Court held that the 
interpretation given to a provision of the MHRA by the Commission was a 
reasonable one when both the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent 
was ambiguous.75  The plaintiff sought damages from her employer on the basis of 
sexual harassment at the workplace76 by a co-worker who was not in a supervisory 
role.77  The Commission interpreted the statute to mean that employers are to be 
held liable not only for sexual harassment claims brought against its supervisors, 
but also against its other employees.78  The court upheld the Commission’s 
interpretation on the grounds that legislative intent was unclear, and such an 
interpretation was “within the particular expertise of the [Commission].”79  
Furthermore, because the rule adopted by the Commission was not arbitrary or 
contrary to the law, the court agreed to follow its position on this particular issue.80    
As FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC and Watt demonstrate, the Law Court will 
                                                                                                     
 66. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 67. 2007 ME 97, 926 A.2d 1197.  
 68. Id. ¶ 1.  
 69. 38 M.R.S.A. § 465 (2001 & Supp. 2012).  
 70. FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC, 2007 ME 97, ¶¶ 6-7, 926 A.2d 1197.  
 71. Id. ¶ 28.  
 72. Id. ¶ 39.  
 73. Id. ¶ 24 (quoting S.D. Warren Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 27, ¶ 5, 868 A.2d 210).  
 74. 2009 ME 47, 969 A.2d 897.  
 75. Id. ¶ 27.  
 76. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (2013).  
 77. Watt, 2009 ME 47, ¶ 25, 969 A.2d 897.  
 78. Id. ¶ 26.  
 79. Id. ¶ 27.  
 80. Id.  
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typically defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute whenever possible.  In addition, these cases indicate that such 
deference will typically be given to an agency regardless of the particular law it 
governs.  By adhering to such an approach, the court has recognized that when a 
statute is unclear and the Legislature has not clarified its position, it makes sense 
for the administering agency to have the first opportunity to carry out the statute as 
it believes the Legislature intended as opposed to the court assuming that role.  
Thus, the Law Court has followed a standard in which it will only overrule an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute when absolutely necessary under 
the circumstances.   
III. THE FUHRMANN DECISION 
A. Factual Background 
While employed at Staples, Fuhrmann, a mother of two children, worked a set 
Monday through Friday schedule from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.81  In 2006, Fuhrmann 
was granted her request to be transferred from the South Portland store to the 
Biddeford store “in order to be closer to her children’s new daycare.”82  
Approximately one year later, Fuhrmann filed three internal reports with Staples’ 
senior loss prevention manager regarding possible violations of company policy 
and tax law.83  The two reports involving violations of company policy ultimately 
led to disciplinary action for the  general manager and operations manager.84  The 
third report, which described a potential “coding discrepancy” in the Staples 
computer system that Fuhrmann believed may constitute a violation of tax law, was 
confirmed to be accurate following an internal investigation.85  In November 2007, 
although neither the senior loss prevention manager nor the district manager were 
able to determine who in fact had been responsible for the miscoding, the  general 
manager eventually took the blame because of her leadership position at the store.86 
Also in November 2007, Fuhrmann was informed at a meeting with the  
general manager and operations manager that she would have to start working 
nights and weekends sporadically.87  Although disputed by Staples, Fuhrmann 
alleged that when she responded that she could not change her set work hours due 
to her children’s daycare schedule and would rather change to part-time status, the 
general manager denied her request “and told her she had one week to rearrange 
her schedule.”88  Fuhrmann was ultimately granted an additional month by human 
resources “to determine if she could work a non-set schedule” in the manner 
requested of her, but because of her children’s daycare hours, Fuhrmann felt forced 
                                                                                                     
 81. Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 2, 58 A.3d 1083. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. ¶ 4.  As for Fuhrmann’s belief that tax law(s) had been violated, Staples disputed that such a 
belief ever existed.  Id.   
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.  
 86. Id. ¶ 6.  
 87. Id. ¶ 7.  
 88. Id. ¶ 8.  It is not known for certain whether Staples’ management asked other employees to 
change their schedules in a similar manner as was asked of Fuhrmann.  Id.   
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to resign and worked her last day at Staples near the beginning of 2008.89   
B. Procedural History 
After filing an initial complaint with the Commission in April 2008, Fuhrmann 
was granted authorization by the Commission to sue Staples, as well as her four 
supervisors consisting of the senior loss prevention manager, general manager, 
operations manager, and district manager.90  She sued on the bases of 
whistleblower retaliation as outlawed under the MHRA and WPA, as well as sex 
discrimination outlawed under the MHRA, and sought punitive damages.91  In 
particular, she claimed that both Staples and the four supervisors retaliated against 
her “for reporting what she believed to be illegal conduct,” and that they also 
unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of being a mother.92 
Staples and the four individual supervisors filed motions to dismiss; the lower 
court granted the supervisors’ motions on the grounds that individual supervisor 
liability does not exist under the WPA or MHRA.93  Although Staples was denied 
its motion to dismiss,94 it later prevailed on  its motion for summary judgment on 
all counts, and with regard to the whistleblower retaliation claim, the lower court 
“concluded that the evidence showed that there was no causal link between her 
internal report about the miscoding of items for donation and the request that she 
change her work schedule.”95  Fuhrmann  appealed to the Law Court with regard to 
her claims against both Staples and her supervisors.96  
C. Arguments 
On appeal, Fuhrmann first argued that the court erred when it granted 
summary judgment in favor of Staples because there remained a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the cause of her forced resignation.97  Next, she argued that 
Maine should recognize individual supervisor liability under the MHRA because it 
“was not intended to preclude individual supervisors from the definition of 
‘employer.’  The plain language of the statute bears this out.”98  She pointed to the 
relevant provision of the MHRA defining “employer” to support this argument,99 as 
well as to the fact that the MHRA explicitly exempts State of Maine employees 
from paying punitive damages arising from claims against them that occurred 
                                                                                                     
 89. Id. ¶ 9.  
 90. Id. ¶ 10.  The action was filed in court in October 2009.  Id.   
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. ¶ 11.  
 96. Id. ¶ 12.  
 97. Amended Brief of Appellant at 13, Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 
135, 58 A.3d 1083 (No. YOR-11-551).  For further argument made by Fuhrmann that the Superior 
Court erred in granting Staples its motion for summary judgment, see id. at 10-20.    
 98. Id. at 21.  
 99. “[A]ny person in this State employing any number of employees, . . . any person acting in the 
interest of any employer, directly or indirectly.”  5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(4) (2013).  
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during the scope of their employment:100   
The converse, then, is also true: that non-governmental individual employees, 
acting within the course or scope of employment, can be held liable for punitive 
damages personally.  It appears intuitive that if individual liability for private 
employees was not contemplated by the MHRA, then there would be no need to 
exempt public employees from claims involving punitive damages.101 
Furthermore, Fuhrmann urged the court to consider the reasoning from its 
prior withdrawn opinion in 2000 which had held that individual liability did exist 
under the MHRA.102  Lastly, recognizing that Maine had never ruled as to whether 
individual liability exists under the WPA, Fuhrmann concluded that because a 
claim under the WPA may only be brought through the MHRA, then individual 
liability must exist under the Act as well based on the same reasoning.103  
The Commission submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Fuhrmann’s 
position, noting its agreement with Fuhrmann that the MHRA is unambiguous 
because the “plain meaning” of the Act permits individual supervisor liability.104  
The Commission further argued that individual supervisor liability makes sense 
because it goes in line with the main purpose of the Act—to stop unlawful 
discrimination, especially in the employment setting.105  It also contended that the 
MHRA definition of “employer” should be construed in the same light as the 
FMLA and FLSA definitions (which federal courts have generally found permit 
individual supervisor liability) because the wording is significantly similar, unlike 
the Title VII, ADEA, and ADA definitions (which federal courts have generally 
found do not permit individual supervisor liability) which do not contain similar 
wording.106  Furthermore, the Commission argued that even if the Law Court were 
to find that the language of the Act was ambiguous, it should defer to the 
reasonable interpretation of the Commission as the Act’s administering agency.107  
The Commission concluded by arguing that the plain meaning of the WPA also 
permits individual supervisor liability.108      
In contrast, Staples argued that the Superior Court did not err by granting its 
motion for summary judgment for a number of reasons.109  The individual 
supervisors then argued that the Law Court should decline to answer the question 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. § 4613(2)(B)(8)(i).  
 101. Amended Brief of Appellant, supra note 97, at 22.  
 102. Id. at 23.  
 103. Id. at 24.  
 104. Brief of Maine Human Rights Commission, supra note 38, at 4-6.  
 105. Id. at 6-7.  
 106. Id. at 10-12.  
 107. Id. at 17-18.  
 108. Id. at 19.  The Maine Employment Lawyers Association (MELA) also submitted an amicus 
curiae brief in support of Fuhrmann, arguing that deference should be given to the Commission’s 
interpretation.  Brief of Maine Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae at 2-4, Fuhrmann v. 
Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, 58 A.3d 1083 (No. YOR-11-551) [hereinafter Brief 
of MELA].  MELA also argued that even if the Act’s definition of “employer” sets forth respondeat 
superior liability, it does not preclude individual supervisor liability, id. at 7-9, and that public policy 
supports the allowance of supervisor liability under the Act, id. at 9-14.  
 109. Brief of Appellees at 20-41, Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, 58 
A.3d 1083 (No. YOR-11-551).  
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of whether individual supervisor liability exists under the MHRA or WPA because 
the issue was moot in light of Staples’ favorable motion for summary judgment, 
but should the court choose to rule on the issue, it should hold that “there is no 
potential liability for any of the individual defendants under the MHRA or 
[]WPA.”110  Because the court generally looks to federal case law interpretation of 
federal anti-discrimination statutes, the individual defendants pointed to the fact 
that every Circuit Court of Appeals found that individual supervisor liability did 
not exist under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA.111  In addition, the individual 
defendants noted that all trial courts in Maine that have dealt with the definition of 
“employer” under the MHRA and WPA have found that it does not allow for 
individual supervisor liability.112  The defendants also argued that the prior 
withdrawn opinion in 2000, which had originally held that individual liability could 
be maintained under the MHRA, should not receive any weight in the court’s 
determination because, inter alia, “it[] [is] not controlling precedent here, or indeed 
precedent at all.”113 
The Maine State Chamber of Commerce and other Maine trade and business 
associations submitted an amici curiae brief in support of the individual 
defendants’ positions, contending that neither the MHRA nor WPA allow for 
individual liability, and it has been “well-settled law upon which Maine employers 
have long relied.”114  The organizations further argued that if individual liability 
were allowed, it would “handicap[] the Maine economy,” and “supervisory 
employees would fear potential civil liability in nearly every aspect of performing 
their supervisory functions . . . [and] would fundamentally alter the way 
supervisors perceive and perform the everyday responsibilities of their jobs.”115  As 
a result, when supervisors consider taking action that could be perceived as 
discriminatory when in fact it is not, they will consciously choose not to act to 
ensure that they do not later get personally sued for those decisions, rather than act 
for the benefit of their employer’s interest.116       
D. Decision of the Law Court 
The Law Court began by vacating the summary judgment motion as it 
pertained to Fuhrmann’s WPA claim because there was enough evidence to 
generate a genuine issue of material fact as to why Staples changed Fuhrmann’s 
schedule.117  It then proceeded to affirm the individual defendants’ motions to 
dismiss by a vote of 4-3 on the grounds that neither the WPA nor MHRA permit 
individual supervisor liability.118  In coming to its ruling, the majority first looked 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 42 (citations omitted).  
 111. Id. at 45-46.  
 112. Id. at 46.  
 113. Id. at 47.  
 114. Amici Brief of Maine State Chamber of Commerce and Other Maine Business and Trade 
Associations at 2, Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, 58 A.3d 1083 (No. 
YOR-11-551).    
 115. Id. at 5.  
 116. Id. at 9.  
 117. Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 21, 58 A.3d 1083. 
 118. Id. ¶ 35.  
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to the definitions of “employer” under the WPA and MHRA,119 and noted that 
while the definitions were not identical, “they both identify the same person, 
because an agent of an employer is by definition a person who acts in the 
employer’s interest.”120  Because it was not clear from the plain meaning whether 
the Acts provided for vicarious liability and/or individual supervisor liability, the 
majority deemed the language to be ambiguous and proceeded to look to legislative 
intent for interpretation.121   
The majority began by declining to determine legislative intent based on 
federal cases interpreting federal anti-discrimination statutes because “[r]elying on 
either strain of federal law to the exclusion of the other would ignore our long-
standing instruction to read seemingly contradictory statutes in a way that leaves 
the efficacy of both intact and achieves a harmonious result.”122  In addition, the 
majority found the legislative history to be of little assistance, and therefore, looked 
to the Commission’s interpretation as the administering agency of the MHRA.123   
In assessing the reasonableness of the Commission’s interpretation of the Acts 
as permitting individual supervisor liability, the majority held that such an 
interpretation was not in accord with the intent of the Legislature.124  Both Acts 
purport to provide an employee with recourse against unlawful discrimination, but 
when reading the definition of “employer” under either Act “in light of those 
purposes . . . [they] are meant to hold the principal/employer liable for acts of its 
agents/employees.”125  The majority went on to explain that the Acts are intended 
to hold only the employer liable because only it “[has] the power and resources to 
remedy discrimination by implementing antidiscrimination policies, reinstating 
employees, or paying penalties.  The remedies and penalties expressly established 
in the MHRA are indicative of the Legislature’s understanding of that fact, as they 
are clearly designed to apply to employers, not individual supervisors.”126  Thus, if 
it were the intent of the Legislature to incorporate individual supervisor liability 
into the MHRA, “it would have done so explicitly in much clearer terms.”127   
Although the dissent concurred in vacating Staples’ motion for summary 
judgment, it disagreed that the MHRA does not provide for individual supervisor 
liability for three reasons.128  First, the plain language of the definition of 
“employer” under the MHRA and WPA is unambiguous and allows an employee to 
sue his individual supervisors,129 as the dissent reasoned that it is clear that “the 
                                                                                                     
 119. Id. ¶ 24.  
 120. Id. ¶ 25.  
 121. Id. ¶ 26. 
 122. Id. ¶ 27.  
 123. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.  
 124. Id. ¶ 31.  
 125. Id. ¶ 32.  
 126. Id. ¶ 33 (citations omitted).  Such remedies cited by the majority include “a cease-and-desist 
order; an order to employ or reinstate the victim with or without back pay; civil penal damages for 
employers with fourteen or fewer employees; and, for employers with more than fourteen employees, 
compensatory and punitive damages commensurate to the size of the employer.”  Id. (citing 5 M.R.S.A. 
§ 4613(2)(B)(1)-(2), (7)-(8) (2013)).   
 127. Id. ¶ 34.  
 128. Id. ¶ 36 (Levy, J., dissenting).  
 129. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39. 
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injured party may file suit against any individual responsible for the unlawful 
discrimination.”130  Second, the definition of “employer” under the MHRA should 
be read in light of the entire statutory scheme, and by refusing to recognize 
individual supervisor liability, the majority ignores the Act’s provision regarding 
punitive damage awards against a state employee (as Fuhrmann argued).131  
Finally, the dissent urged the court to “exercise restraint and defer to that 
interpretation [given by the Commission] because it is reasonable and because the 
MHRA does not compel a contrary interpretation.”132  In particular, Justice Levy 
acknowledged that while several of the specific remedies cited by the majority 
would only apply to employers, the majority ignored the instructions of the 
Legislature to select an “appropriate remedy from the optional, nonexhaustive list 
provided by the statute.”133  Also, the Commission’s interpretation furthers the 
purpose of the Act by allowing an employee to sue both his employer and the 
individual wrongdoer.134  
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Likely Consequences of Fuhrmann 
The Fuhrmann decision definitively restricts an employee from suing his 
individual supervisor(s) under the MHRA or WPA when claiming employment 
discrimination.  Although the Commission had maintained a consistent position 
since 2003 that such liability did exist under the MHRA, the Law Court chose to 
adopt the opposite position on the grounds that the Commission’s interpretation 
was unreasonable as evidenced by the overall purposes of the Act to only allow for 
vicarious liability.  As a result, not only will employees be prevented in the future  
from bringing whistleblower and sex discrimination claims against their 
supervisors (as Fuhrmann had done), but they will also be prevented from bringing 
any other claim of unlawful discrimination against their supervisors under the 
MHRA, including on the bases of race, sexual orientation, disability, religion, age, 
or national origin.135 
Employees will now only have one party—their employer—to seek recourse 
against when alleging unlawful discrimination in the workplace.  In some 
situations, dismissal will be the proper outcome as the employee may not have a 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. ¶ 38.  
 131. Id. ¶ 41.  “Punitive damages may not be included in a judgment or award . . . against an 
employee of a governmental entity based on a claim that arises out of an act or omission occurring 
within the course or scope of that employee’s employment.”  5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8)(i) (2013) 
(emphasis added).  
 132. Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 43, 58 A.3d 1083.  
 133. Id. ¶ 44.  When a court finds that unlawful discrimination has occurred, it “must specify an 
appropriate remedy or remedies . . . [and those] remedies may include, but are not limited to . . . .”  5 
M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B).    
 134. Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 47, 58 A.3d 1083.  
 135. Commission Counsel interprets the Fuhrmann decision much more narrowly, arguing that 
individuals may still be liable for their actions in employment discrimination claims that do not involve 
the WPA or 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(4).  Memorandum from John Gause, Commission Counsel, Maine 
Human Rights Commission, to Commission Staff on Individual liability after Fuhrmann v. Staples (Apr. 
11, 2013), available at  http://www.maine.gov/mhrc/guidance/memo/20130411_g.pdf.  
360 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
valid claim to raise a genuine issue of material fact against his employer.  On the 
other hand, if one of the purposes of the MHRA is to combat unlawful 
discrimination, and the court has the power to provide an “appropriate remedy” 
based on the circumstances, it logically follows that it may make sense in some 
situations to hold individual supervisors liable for their illegal conduct if such a 
remedy is deemed appropriate. 
While the majority in Fuhrmann rightfully concluded that the definitions of 
“employer” under the MHRA and WPA are ambiguous, it should have deferred to 
the Commission’s interpretation because such a construction was reasonable and 
did not plainly compel a contrary result.  Moreover, the Legislature should be 
called upon to clarify whether the MHRA provides for individual supervisor 
liability.  Upon doing so, the Legislature should declare once and for all that 
individual supervisor liability exists under the MHRA in narrow circumstances 
because such a construction supports the purposes of the Act, and provides an 
employee the option of recovery from his supervisor when appropriate. 
B. The Fuhrmann Majority Should Have Adopted the Commission’s  
Interpretation of “Employer” Because It Was Reasonable 
The majority in Fuhrmann correctly found that the definitions of “employer” 
under both the MHRA and WPA are ambiguous based on its plain meaning.  For 
instance, nowhere within the MHRA definition does one find the word 
“supervisor,” but the definition does include a “person” who acts on behalf of an 
employer.  The definition of a person includes an “individual.”  Is an individual 
synonymous with a supervisor?  In addition, the majority properly declined to 
clarify these ambiguities by examining the interpretations given by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals to federal antidiscrimination statutes because these courts do not 
hold that all five statutes identified in Part II.B of this Note only incorporate 
vicarious liability.  The language under the WPA reads similarly to the federal 
statutes deemed to only allow vicarious liability, while the language under the 
MHRA reads similarly to those statutes deemed to allow individual liability.  
Considering the MHRA authorizes a cause of action under the WPA, favoring one 
federal interpretation over the other would not achieve the court’s rightful desire 
for a “harmonious result.”  
The majority then purported to apply its highly deferential standard to the 
Commission’s interpretation of the MHRA as the administering agency, much like 
it has done in other contexts involving administering agencies, as seen in FPL 
Energy Maine Hydro LLC and Watt.  In this case, however, the majority clearly 
showed no such deference to the Commission, and instead, declined to adopt its 
position on the grounds that employers are best suited to discipline its supervisory 
employees, and the Legislature clearly meant to only incorporate vicarious liability 
based on the specific remedies noted in the Act.  As the dissent correctly pointed 
out, this reasoning is flawed because the remedies section is not an exhaustive 
list—the court has the power to implement “appropriate” remedies not otherwise 
listed.  Thus, the remedies section does not clarify legislative intent. 
Furthermore, if the majority had been applying its typical test for 
reasonableness in relation to an administering agency’s interpretation of an 
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ambiguous statute, it should have found that the Commission’s interpretation in 
this case was reasonable because it did not “plainly compel a contrary result.”  In 
other words, it could not be said that the Commission’s interpretation was so 
obviously the opposite of what the Act could allow for.  Unlike Watt, where the 
court deferred to the Commission’s interpretation in part because of legislative 
intent being unclear, the majority attempted to clarify legislative intent itself rather 
than leaving that to the job of the Commission.  Analogizing to the federal standard 
outlined in Chevron, the majority did not need to impose its own construction of 
the statute, because the interpretation given by the Commission was based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.  Moreover, as the dissent correctly argued, 
in light of the purposes of the Act to both prevent unlawful employment 
discrimination and provide victims with suitable remedies, such an interpretation 
by the Commission could not be said to plainly compel a contrary result.136  
Therefore, the majority should have accepted the position of the Commission on 
this issue, because as noted in FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC and Watt, 
administering agencies are in a better position than the court to interpret ambiguous 
statutes. 
C. The Maine Legislature Should Clarify Its Position By Explicitly Declaring That 
Individual Supervisor Liability Exists Under the MHRA 
As evidenced by the 4-3 split in Fuhrmann, the Law Court is divided as to 
whether the Legislature intended the definition of “employer” to allow individual 
supervisors to be sued for unlawful discrimination under the MHRA.  As noted in 
Part II.A of this Note, the Legislature had opportunities in 2001 and 2003 to clarify 
its position on this issue but declined to do so.  Nevertheless, the time has come for 
a new bill to be brought forth to the Legislature to explicitly declare whether an 
individual supervisor may be sued under the Act.  Even if the Legislature were to 
uphold the ruling in Fuhrmann, an explicit declaration would once and for all put 
an end to the constant debate regarding the wording of the Act that will likely 
linger despite the Fuhrmann ruling.  
This Note, however, advocates for the opposite result: the Legislature should 
proclaim that individual supervisors may in fact be liable for their unlawful acts 
under the MHRA in narrow circumstances because it goes in line with the purposes 
of the Act—to prevent unlawful employment discrimination and provide recourse 
for victimized employees.137   
Approximately one decade ago, a Comment published in the Maine Law 
Review agreed that the Legislature should clarify its position due to the ambiguity 
of the language in the Act,138 but contended that the Act should only allow the 
                                                                                                     
 136. Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶¶ 46-47, 58 A.3d 1083.   
 137. In adopting the position of this Note, the Author recognizes that although federal courts have 
differed in holding for or against individual liability, one commentator argues that “the appellate courts 
consistently hold that liability should fall solely to the employer, thus prohibiting individual liability, 
even when the individual is acting as an agent of the employer.”  Tammi J. Lees, Note, The Individual 
vs. The Employer: Who Should Be Held Liable Under Employment Discrimination Law?, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 861, 863 (2004).  
 138. Rand, supra note 28, at 461.  
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employer to be sued.139  First, the author argued that individual liability need not be 
adopted because “employers can be counted on to terminate or at least discipline 
discriminating supervisors whose actions lead to lawsuits,” and because such 
liability would have a ‘chilling effect’ and “pose[] a very real threat to effective 
business decision-making” (i.e., a supervisor would fear being personally sued for 
his decisions, and therefore, be more likely to act out of personal interest rather 
than for the employer’s interest).140  Much like the majority opinion in Fuhrmann, 
the author assumed that employers will generally discipline its supervisors who 
commit unlawful discrimination in the workplace, but that is not necessarily true.  
For instance, there is a higher risk that an employer will not discipline its 
supervisor(s) if the employer is a family business (e.g., an owner’s son is the 
individual supervisor who commits unlawful discrimination against an employee).  
Such an assumption also does not take into account those repeat offender 
supervisors who violate the MHRA and are either not disciplined at all, or get a 
“slap on the wrist” and proceed just as before.  It simply puts too much faith in 
employers to consistently discipline its supervisors for their unlawful acts.   
As for the “chilling effect” argument, this would seem to be a good thing and 
promote the purposes of the MHRA because it would make an otherwise 
discriminatory supervisor conscious of the consequences of his actions (i.e., it 
prevents unlawful discrimination).141  Creating such consciousness is simply good 
policy if the Legislature is serious about preventing all forms of discrimination in 
the workplace.  As one commentator points out, “[p]lacing the blame on the 
individual discriminator . . . better serves the interests of public policy and 
justice.”142  Although a nondiscriminatory supervisor may fear that his actions 
against an employee could lead to a potential lawsuit against him personally, he 
need not fear an adverse result if he did not in fact unlawfully discriminate against 
an employee.  In fact, research shows that “juries tend to be more sympathetic to an 
individual defendant than a corporate defendant and are less likely to assess 
damages against an individual.”143  Plus, at least in the corporate context, directors 
(and officers acting as directors) of a corporation are typically protected by the 
highly deferential “business judgment” rule.144 
The author also argued that while victims may have no recourse if the 
employer is “bankrupt or insolvent,” or raises the Faragher defense,145 neither 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 465.  
 140. Id. at 462-63.  
 141. MELA correctly countered the “chilling effect” proposition in its amicus brief by also arguing 
that such an effect could promote a positive result.  Brief of MELA, supra note 108, at 10.   
 142. Lees, supra note 137, at 881. 
 143. Ann E. Employee v. You: Personal Liability and the HR Professional, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
SOLUTIONS (Apr. 2005), http://www.epspros.com/NewsResources/Newsletters?find=13954.  
 144. Under the “business judgment” rule, in the absence of fraud, self-interest or otherwise unlawful 
conduct (among other narrow exceptions), corporate directors will not be held personally liable for their 
business decisions because it is presumed that they acted in good faith on an informed basis, and 
reasonably believed that their actions were in the best interests of the corporation.  Rosenthal v. 
Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 353-54 (Me. 1988). 
 145. The Faragher defense states that an employer is not to be held liable for unlawful sexual 
harassment committed by its supervisor(s) when “the employer had exercised reasonable care to avoid 
harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and . . . the complaining employee . . . failed to act 
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situation would require implementation of individual supervisor liability under the 
MHRA.146  I recommend that these are two narrow circumstances in which 
individual supervisor liability should be imposed.  Although assets of an individual 
supervisor could be limited in some situations, especially where an employer is 
bankrupt or insolvent, it would at least provide an employee with a possible remedy 
by pursuing a suit against the actual wrongdoer.  Such a remedy would be 
particularly appropriate where an individual supervisor does in fact have the assets 
to satisfy a court judgment.  In response to the Faragher defense, which exempts 
an employer from liability if certain conditions are met when an individual 
supervisor has committed unlawful sexual harassment against an employee, this  
seems to be the exact situation in which an employee should be able to sue his 
supervisor in light of the employer exemption.  In fact, an employee may prefer to 
sue the wrongdoing supervisor in such a situation where the unlawful 
discrimination is as egregious and personal as in the context of sexual harassment.  
Subsequently, a Maine court would then presumably have discretion to provide an 
appropriate remedy on a case-by-case basis as it may do in accordance with the 
remedies provision of the Act.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The majority decision in Fuhrmann was the improper ruling, because the 
Commission’s interpretation of the definition of “employer” under both the MHRA 
and WPA were reasonable and did not plainly compel a contrary result.  Therefore, 
the majority should have upheld the Commission’s interpretation (as the dissent 
would have) and ruled that individual supervisor liability is permitted.  
Nevertheless, the Legislature should take action and declare definitively that 
individual supervisor liability does indeed exist under the Act.  Such a declaration 
will not only provide clarity to the Act, which will likely still be debated even in 
light of the ruling in Fuhrmann, but more importantly, will promote the overall 
purposes of the Act to stop unlawful discrimination at the workplace and provide 
suitable remedies for victimized employees in appropriate and narrow 
circumstances, such as in the context of employer insolvency and sexual 
harassment. 
  
                                                                                                     
with like reasonable care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm 
that could have been avoided.”  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998).    
 146. Rand, supra note 28, at 463.  
